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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OREM CITY, 
: CaseNo.20041087-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRAD HAROLD MASSEY, 
: (not incarcerated) 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this 
misdemeanor appeal. 
ISSUE. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Do the trial court's failure to inform Massey of his right to counsel, and failure to 
obtain a waiver of that right prior to Massey's bench trial, require a new trial? 
Because the trial court made no relevant findings of fact, this issue presents a 
question of law, to be reviewed without deference, for correctness. See, e.g.. State v. 
Bvington. 936 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1997). 
This issue was preserved by the motion for a new trial filed by counsel whom 
Massey retained after he was convicted in his pro se trial (R. 19). 
Regardless of whether the issue was fully preserved, this Court should reverse the 
conviction under the plain error and exceptional circumstances doctrines, discussed infra. 
OO0Q87 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULE 
The controlling constitutional provisions, statutes and rule are copied in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The City charged Massey with one count of reckless driving, a Class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45 (R. 1). 
At the arraignment, Judge Backlund informed Massey of the charge, took a plea of 
not guilty and gave him a trial date (T. 9/29/2004 at 2). 
Mr. Massey represented himself at a bench trial before Judge Backlund (R. 7-8). 
The court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to probation (R. 7-8). 
Through counsel, Massey moved for a new trial, presenting newly discovered 
evidence - an eyewitness to the driving pattern, who opined that Massey was not driving 
recklessly (R. 10-22). The motion for a new trial also argued that Massey should have 
had counsel during the first trial (R. 19). The court denied the motion "on the basis of 
unsubstantial evidence." (R. 27). 
Massey filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 29). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Justin Sprague, a Utah Valley State College Police officer, stopped a silver 
Porches 911 Turbo being driven by Massey (R. 47 at 3-4). He estimated that the car was 
2 
going over 100 miles an hour on 1-15, where the limit is 65 (R. 47 at 4). He claimed 
Massey changed lanes without signaling, and did not stay in a lane for three seconds 
before changing (R. 47 at 5). He could not catch Massey until Massey slowed and took 
the off ramp (R. 47 at 5). Sprague told Massey he had been going over 100 miles an 
hour, and Massey did not deny it, but did explain that he had been working on the car and 
was driving so fast to get an air bubble out of "the line." (R. 47 at 6). 
Massey testified that he was speeding, but that he only changed one lane and 
signaled before turning (R. 47 at 8). He guessed he was going eighty eight miles an hour 
(R. 47 at 9). 
Massey was convicted of reckless driving in a bench trial (R. 7-8). 
At the arraignment and at the trial, the court never informed Massey of his right to 
counsel, or obtained a waiver of that right (T. 9/24/2004 at 2, R. 47 at 3-36). 
Following the bench trial, Massey retained counsel, who argued that Massey 
should have had counsel during the first trial (R. 19). 
The trial court interpreted this argument as an insult and rejected it out of hand, 
stating: 
You act like if someone comes in here for a speeding trial, they are 
automatically convicted if they don't have Counsel. Thank you for 
denigrating the Court. Don't you think I listen to the evidence before I 
render a verdict on both sides? 
(R. 61 at 9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
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In failing to inform Massey of his right to counsel, and in failing to obtain a proper 
waiver of that right, the trial court violated the constitutions, Utah Code, and the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Because the findings that should have been made regarding the waiver cannot be 
made post hoc, a new trial is required. 
ARGUMENT 
The right to counsel in criminal cases is provided by the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and by Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., 
Webster v. Jones, 
587 P.2d 528, 530 (Utah, 1978). The right to counsel in criminal cases is also secured by 
the Due Process Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions. See, e.g.. State v. 
Spiers, 361 P.2d 509, 510 (Utah 1961). The right to counsel in criminal cases is also 
recognized in the Utah Code, § 77-l-6(l)(a). 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require magistrates to inform criminal 
defendants of their rights to retained or appointed counsel, see Utah R. Crim. P. 7(e)(3), 
and require magistrates to appoint counsel in cases wherein the criminal defendants are 
indigent and face a substantial probability of deprivation of liberty. See Utah R. Crim. 8(a). 
When criminal defendants proceed pro se, due process requires trial courts to 
insure that the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to 
counsel. Spiers, supra, at 510; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Trial courts 
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are supposed to evaluate all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the 
accused's conduct, background and experience. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 
464(1938). 
In Utah, trial court are supposed to conduct an in-depth on-the-record colloquy to 
assess whether the defendant understands the risks he undertakes in waiving the right to 
counsel, and is able to make a knowing and voluntary choice in waiving counsel. State v. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987). Suggested areas of inquiry include "whether 
defendant has studied law; defendant's experience at self-representation; the charges and 
possible penalties faced; familiarity with, and the expectation of adherence to, procedural 
and evidentiary rules; a warning that the trial court will not direct or advise the defense; a 
recommendation against self-representation; and whether the choice of self-representation 
is voluntary. Finally, appointment of standby counsel should be considered." State v. 
DrobeL 815 P.2d 724, 732 (Utah App. 1991). 
Utah law recognizes that when a criminal defendant represents himself at trial in 
the absence of a proper inquiry into the extent of the knowing and voluntary nature of the 
waiver, reversal is required, because trial courts cannot make the necessary findings post 
hoc. See, State v. Bakalov. 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993). 
In Bakalov, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and failed to conduct a 
proper colloquy before repeatedly refusing Mr. Bakalov's efforts to waive his right to 
counsel. The court of appeals remanded the matter to the trial court for consideration 
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under the proper legal standard, of whether Bakalov could have waived his rights to 
counsel. See icL,862 P.2d at 1355, and Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 635-37 (Utah App. 1993). 
The supreme court reversed, agreeing with Judge Greenwood, who stated in her opinion 
for the Court of Appeals: 
The circumstances existing prior to Dr. Bakalov's trial cannot be recreated. 
... [T]he trial court never advised Dr. Bakalov of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation and thus could not then or now assess 
his responses to that advice. 
862 P.2d at 1355, quoting Bakalov, 849 P.2d at 637. 
In the instant matter, the trial court never informed Massey of his right to counsel, 
never conducted a proper colloquy, never obtained a waiver of the right to counsel, and 
never made any of the findings necessary to the waiver that never occurred. This violated 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Constitution of 
Utah, Article I §§ 7 and 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6, and Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 7 and 8, supra. The error cannot be corrected by the entry of post hoc findings. 
See Bakalov, supra. 
There is a reasonable likelihood of a different result in the absence of Massey's 
pro se representation, because the evidence was an evenly balanced credibility contest 
before the motion for a new trial. See Statement of Facts. A defense attorney may well 
have been able to obtain a lesser conviction for speeding, or a plea bargain to some other 
lesser offense. 
It appears that this type of error is viewed as structural in any event, given the 
6 
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Bakalov court's finding of harmful error without any evidentiary analysis whatsoever, see 
jd., 862 P.2d 1355, and given the well-established law recognizing that prejudice is 
presumed in cases wherein counsel is denied. See, e.g.. State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 
442 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)). 
Particularly because Massey was never informed of his right to counsel, there is 
nothing upon which to predicate or hypothecate a waiver. See also, Kuehnert v Turner, 
499 P.2d 839, 840-41 (Utah 1972) (in reversing sentence because counsel was not 
present, the court stated, "since plaintiff was not informed of his right to the presence of 
counsel, there is no ground upon which to predicate a waiver of this right."). 
Accordingly, reversal of the conviction is in order. See id. 
To the extent that trial counsel's motion for a new trial did not fully preserve this 
issue, this Court should reach the merits of the issue under the exceptional circumstances 
and/or plain error doctrines. 
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare 
procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29,123, 94 P.3d 186. 
The application of this doctrine would be appropriate here, where Massey was 
wholly deprived and uninformed regarding his right to counsel, and where the trial court 
had no appreciation for the right to counsel, and was personally affronted by the 
suggestion that Massey should have had counsel in the bench trial (R. 61 at 9). 
7 
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The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Constitutional errors are 
particularly appropriate for correction under the plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.\ cert, denied. 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999). 
The law requiring the trial court to inform Massey of his right to counsel, and to 
obtain a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel prior to the pro se trial 
has been black letter law in Utah for years. See, e.g.. Frampton. supra. The trial court's 
error in this regard was obvious, and was prejudicial as explained above, assuming 
arguendo that prejudice need be shown. But see Strickland, supra (prejudice is presumed 
in cases wherein counsel is denied). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Massey's conviction and remand the matter for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ day of IrWgyyjh \ . 2005. 
^ r & J & A 
D. Gilbert Athay 
Counsel for Mr. Massey 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing, first 
class postage pre-paid to: the Utah County Attorney's Office, 97 East Center Street, 
Orem, Utah 84057, this 4 day of $HtfUiAh , 2005. 
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ADDENDUM 
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Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
2. (a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense 
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is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial 
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or 
fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the 
costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his 
wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an 
infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 
(a) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant shall appear 
before the court as directed in the summons. 
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without a warrant, the 
person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail. If an 
information has not been filed, one shall be filed without delay before the magistrate 
having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(c)(1) In order to detain any person arrested without a warrant, as soon as is reasonably 
feasible but in no event longer than 48 hours after the arrest, a determination shall be 
made as to whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee. The 
determination may be made by any magistrate, although if the arrestee is charged with a 
capital offense, the magistrate may not be a justice court judge. The arrestee need not be 
present at the probable cause determination. 
(c)(2) A written probable cause statement shall be presented to the magistrate, although 
the statement may be verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or otherwise 
electronically transmitted to the magistrate. 
(c)(2)(A) A statement which is verbally communicated by telephone shall be reduced to a 
sworn written statement prior to submitting the probable cause issue to the magistrate for 
decision. The person reading the statement to the magistrate shall verify to the magistrate 
that the person is reading the written statement verbatim, and shall write on the statement 
that person's name and title, the date and time of the communication with the magistrate, 
and the determination the magistrate directs to be indicated on the statement. 
(c)(2)(B) If a statement is verbally communicated by telephone, telefaxed, or otherwise 
electronically transmitted, the original statement shall, as soon as practicable, be filed 
with the court where the case will be filed. 
(c)(3) The magistrate shall review the probable cause statement and from it determine 
whether there is probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee. 
(c)(3)(A) If the magistrate finds there is not probable cause to continue to detain the 
arrestee, the magistrate shall order the immediate release of the arrestee. 
(c)(3)(B) If the magistrate finds probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee, the 
magistrate shall immediately make a bail determination. The bail determination shall 
coincide with the recommended bail amount in the Uniform Fine/Bail Schedule unless the 
magistrate finds substantial cause to deviate from the Schedule. 
(c)(4) The presiding district court judge shall, in consultation with the Justice Court 
Administrator, develop a rotation of magistrates which assures availability of magistrates 
consistent with the need in that particular district. The schedule shall take into account the 
case load of each of the magistrates, their location and their willingness to serve. 
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(c)(5) Nothing in this subsection (c) is intended to preclude the accomplishment of other 
procedural processes at the time of the determination referred to in paragraph (c)(1) above. 
(d)(1) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was committed the 
person arrested shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county where the crime 
was committed and shall be taken before the proper magistrate under these rules. 
(d)(2) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to the county and 
the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail 
may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), the person arrested may 
state in writing a desire to forfeit bail, waive trial in the district in which the information 
is pending, and consent to disposition of the case in the county in which the person was 
arrested, is held, or is present. 
(d)(3) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in which the 
information is pending shall transmit the papers in the proceeding or copies of them to the 
clerk of the court for the county in which the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The 
prosecution shall continue in that county. 
(d)(4) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the warrant. 
(d)(5) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misdemeanor for which a 
voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), 
the defendant shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the 
county of arrest for the determination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail 
or held without bail under Section 77-20-1. 
(d)(6) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense, with 
the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate. 
(e) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon the defendant's 
first appearance, inform the defendant: 
(e)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy; 
(e)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how 
to obtain them; 
(e)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court without 
expense if unable to obtain counsel; 
(e)(4) of rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
(e)(5) that the defendant is not required to make any statement, and that the statements the 
defendant does make may be used against the defendant in a court of law. 
(f) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under paragraph (e) and before 
proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult 
counsel and shall allow the defendant to contact any attorney by any reasonable means, 
without delay and without fee. 
(g) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate shall call upon 
the defendant to enter a plea. 
(g)(1) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided 
by law. 
(g)(2) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not be extended 
except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these rules and law applicable to 
criminal cases. 
(h)(1) If a defendant is charged with a felony, the defendant shall be advised of the right 
to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives the right to a preliminary 
examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall order the 
defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
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(h)(2) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall 
schedule the preliminary examination. The examination shall be held within a reasonable 
time, but not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody for the offense charged and 
not later than 30 days if the defendant is not in custody. These time periods may be 
extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be 
held if the defendant is indicted. 
(I)(l) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under the rules 
and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of 
proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the 
defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant 
may also cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
(I)(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall 
order that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of 
probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on 
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the 
preliminary examination. 
(I)(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has 
been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the 
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not 
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
(j) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either party, may 
exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses not to converse with 
each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party, 
the magistrate may order all spectators to be excluded from the courtroom. 
(k)(l) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court, the 
magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall transmit to the clerk of the 
district court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings before the magistrate, 
including exhibits, recordings, and any typewritten transcript. 
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(k)(2) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sheriff, the magistrate 
shall execute the appropriate commitment order. 
(I)(l) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness in a pending 
case will not appear and testify unless bond is required, the magistrate may fix a bond 
with or without sureties and in a sum considered adequate for the appearance of the witness. 
(1)(2) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the court, the 
magistrate may commit the witness to jail until the witness complies or is otherwise 
legally discharged. 
(1)(3) If the witness does provide bond when required, the witness may be examined and 
cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the defendant and the testimony 
shall be recorded. The witness shall then be discharged. 
(1)(4) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent hearing or trial 
when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be used at the hearing or trial in lieu 
of the personal testimony of the witness. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 
(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to self representation, and if 
indigent, has the right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces a substantial 
probability of deprivation of liberty. 
(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant who is 
charged with an offense for which the punishment may be death, the court shall appoint 
two or more attorneys to represent such defendant and shall make a finding on the record 
based on the requirements set forth below that appointed counsel is proficient in the trial 
of capital cases. In making its determination, the court shall ensure that the experience of 
counsel who are under consideration for appointment have met the following minimum requirements 
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to verdict six felony cases 
within the past four years or twenty-five felony cases total; 
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(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in 
a capital or a felony homicide case which was tried to a jury and which went to final verdict; 
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed or taught within the past 
five years an approved continuing legal education course or courses at least eight hours of 
which deal, in substantial part, with the trial of death penalty cases; and 
(4) the experience of one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five years in 
the active practice of law. 
(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a capital case, the court should 
also consider at least the following factors: 
(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration have previously appeared as 
counsel or co-counsel in a capital case; 
(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have sufficient time and support 
and can dedicate those resources to the representation of the defendant in the capital case 
now pending before the court with undivided loyalty to the defendant; 
(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have engaged in the active 
practice of criminal law in the past five years; 
(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being considered; and 
(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to be appointed 
will fairly, efficiently and effectively provide representation to the defendant. 
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to death, the court shall appoint 
one or more attorneys to represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding that 
counsel is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be found proficient to represent on 
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appeal persons sentenced to death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys 
must meet the following requirements: 
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least three felony appeals; and 
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past five years an 
approved continuing legal education course which deals, in substantial part, with the trial 
or appeal of death penalty cases. 
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent petitioner pursuant 
to 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(a). the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to 
represent such petitioner at post-conviction trial and on post-conviction appeal and shall 
make a finding that counsel is qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-
conviction cases. To be found qualified, the combined experience of the appointed 
attorneys must meet the following requirements: 
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as counsel in at least three 
felony or post-conviction appeals; 
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in 
a post-conviction case at the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated 
proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation; 
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have attended and completed or taught 
within the past five years an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in 
substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death penalty cases or with the prosecution or 
defense of post-conviction proceedings in death penalty cases; 
(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to judgment or verdict three 
civil jury or felony cases within the past four years or ten cases total; and 
(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five 
years in the active practice of law. 
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this 
rule shall not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively 
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal. 
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be paid as described in Chapter 32 
of Title 77. 
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel shall be paid pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. $ 78-35a-202f2Yc). 
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Because defendant works solely with and around vehicles, he 
cannot have a moving violation conviction on his record." 
I wonder about that. If that's true, why would he — 
I mean, even he admits he was going 8 8 miles an hour on the 
freeway. Isn't that really his responsibility? 
Then it says, "In other words, Officer Sprague's 
unjustified and completely unsubstantiated charge of reckless 
driving has ruined the defendant's professional life. In the 
snap of an officer's overzealous ticket book, defendant went 
from being a successful mechanic to being unemployed, and a 
poster boy for vocational rehabilitation." Don't you think 
that paragraph is a little over the top? 
MR. JARDINE: It may well be, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I think so, Counsel. 
MR. JARDINE: And I do apologize to the Court — 
THE COURT: I mean, "In the snap of an officer's 
overzealous ticket book"? 
MR. JARDINE: Your Honor, if I may — 
THE COURT: When I read things like that, I'm offended. 
MR. JARDINE: And I do apol — 
THE COURT: You act like if someone comes in here for a 
speeding trial, they are automatically convicted if they don't 
have Counsel. Thank you for denigrating the Court. Don't you 
think I listen to the evidence before I render a verdict on 
both sides? 
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